INTRODUCTION
The change in the political power structure is not only a result of a broader socio-economic and sociocultural transformation; but also has a character that opens, accelerates and determines the direction of these large -scale transformations. Usually for the "revolutionary" committees that act to establish the political power on a new basis, change in the political power structure has been seen as an instrument of these large-scale transformations as well as a part of the those. In this context, if the new form of political power which is proposed to replace the "old" form of power and attempted to be built after the "revolution", prevents the transformation of the "Old Regime" towards the desired direction or the elimination of the threat of the "remnants" of the Old Regime or the groups outside the main core of the revolutionary group cause the lead the revolution out of the way by trying to determine the direction of the revolution, then what should be done? Will the revolutionary committee abandon the transformation of social, cultural, economic structure or its principles? In other words, will some principles be ignored for the sake of the institutionalization of the revolution, or are they to be subjected to a new interpretation in accordance with the aims of the revolutionary committee? On the other hand, in the process in which the old power relations and the power block are demolished and the new one is being tried to be formed, the "revolutionary" committee which demolished the old power structure, tries to reconstruct and redefine itself; thus is positioning itself within the new regime. Transformation of such committees that now have or control the political power though was in opposition in the past, is inevitable in the new conjuncture.
This transformation process is quite challenging and complex. Moreover, it can also be expected to emerge conflicts in the revolutionary committee itself in the post-revolutionary period, if the revolutionary committee is composed of different groups in itself. In the complex composition of all these events, for these revolutionary committees the consolidation of the "revolutionary position" is more important than everything. The institutionalization of the revolution by the way of consolidation means that the revolutionary position becomes hegemonic without serious challengers, and of course, hegemony cannot be established in a night (Close and Prevost, 2007: 1) . In this process, it is clear that having political power as a key of social-political transformations is the most important thing.
In 1908, a political revolution also entered into the agenda in the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Abdulhamid had to recall the parliament which was sent to holiday in 1878 by himself and put the constitution back into force. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) * , which forced Sultan Abdülhamit to reenact the Constitution, preferred to establish a control mechanism over the political power instead of taking power directly (Aksin, 1987: 87) . However, "the Committee had an inhomogeneous structure in terms of its program and the opinions of its members and did not get rid of the characteristics of the Young Turk movement. Man of all kinds of political thought, such as monarchists , republican, socialist, liberal, Turkist, pro-caliphate were united under the roof of the Committee to destroy the absolute regime " (Tunaya, 2004: 23) . This ideological fragmentation became even more evident when considering the parliament members of the Committee . According to Yalçın (1954b: 4) , "it would be a very meaningless effort to search for the consensus among the deputies which were unified in the parliament under the name of Party of Union and Progress. In the party it could be seen the most fundamentalist, the most scheming, the most greediest , the most conservative and the most interestoriented men at the same time."
Of the 275 members of the parliament, 160 were members of the CUP (Tanör, 1986: 41) . Nevertheless, the deputies who were considered to be Unionists were not gathered around a homogenous ideology. In many regions of the Empire, the CUP had to nominate some people who did not comply with Unionist ideals and qualifications for election, because no other one else could be elected in those regions (Aksin, 1987: 150) . All this was indicative of the fact that beyond the general structure of the Parliament, the qualifications of the Unionist deputies also would become a problem for the CUP, which wanted to govern the Empire in their own way.
While the constitution, parliament, elections, etc. were realizing by itself, the CUP was in an effort to redefine and reorganize itself during this new process. On the one hand, after 1908, trying to protect and partly maintain its secret organizational presence, on the other hand trying to achieve a legitimate and a legal position in the politics of the country had created a contradiction. This situation naturally brought about the debate whether the CUP was an organization or a political party. It was decided in 1908 Congress of the CUP convened in Thessaloniki that the members of the CUP which were also deputies in the Parliament would work under the name of Party of Union and Progress (Tunaya, 1952: 207) . † In this case, a bilateral structure emerged as on one side the organization of the CUP which did not yet consider itself as a party and behave like a party and on the other hand the deputy members of this organization in the Parliament.
This period, began in 1908 and continued at least formally until 1913, marked a very challenging process in which the CUP attempted to turn into a political party. The analysis such as " Despite the fact that in the West electoral associations were developed towards a party, in Turkey, starting from the Ottoman period -the revolutionary organizations turned into a party in the parliament" (Tanilli, 1988: 227) is appropriate not only for Turkey, but for many developing countries. Such structures have made a pendulum movement between being a secret, revolutionary organization and shaping itself as a legal political party. On the one hand, they tend to turn into a political party in order to secure their legitimacy within the "new" political system, while they open up the reflexes of the secret organization on every occasion. This contradiction, which is one of the main issues for the political parties in general, but especially for the ones in which ideological aspect and emphasis are more evident, was observed for the CUP too. In that period, one of the main problems of the CUP was the difficulty of transforming itself into a legal political party from a secret and illegal committee.
Even the CUP itself did not have a clear idea of its nature in this transition period. This situation rooted both from the conjuncture of the Empire and from the organizational structure of the CUP. The question that everyone wanted to answer in the new political conjuncture of the Second Constitutional Era was whether the CUP would remain as a revolutionary organization or would become a political party? Even the Unionists themselves could not give a clear answer to this question. Huseyin Cahid, one of the most popular figures of the Unionists, chose to define the CUP not as a "party" in 1908. But Huseyin Cahid also preferred to define it as a powerful "political party" with more than 140 deputies in 1909 (Tunaya, 1989: 168) . One of the accusations of the anti-Unionists had focused on the fact that the CUP was not a political party, but it was a secret committee * . Such an accusation against the Unionists was brought to the agenda also in the court proceedings of the armistice period (Tunaya, 1989: 212) . The answers given by some Unionists during these trials reflected the adventure of a secret committee which could not transform itself into a political party.
Mithat Şükrü, one of the general secretaries of the CUP, described the Committee as a political party. But he said "After the revolution it tried to break into that shape" when he was giving an answer to the question as "when does it become a political party" (Tunaya, 1989:212) . Mithat Şükrü's answer was a summary of the process. An illegal organization had been tried to be a political party, but it couldn't manage completely.
As mentioned above, in 1908, deputy members of the CUP were accepted to work under the name of the "Party"; in this case, a bilateral structure emerged, one being the main core of the Committee and the other being a group of deputy members of the CUP. A relationship was established between the Committee and the "Party" by which the first would control the second. Deputies, though they were elected, would work under the tutelage of the CUP, more precisely under the Central Committee of the CUP. The Central Committee did not intend to give no further meanings, duties and authorities to the "party". Akşin states this situation as ".Party was a second class situation as compared with the Committee, even it can be said that, it was just like the instrument of the Committee." (Akşin, 1987: 150) .
The nature of the relationship between the Committee and the "Party" was summarized by Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, who could be regarded as a pro-Central Committee at that time, with the following ironical statements: "After the deputies came to the Parliament thanks to the Committee and the Party, they were in a state of importance and influence. On the day of which they left the Parliament, they would be null again. Was it not necessary for a deputy who appreciate in mind though not explicitly confess, to surrender to those who made him a deputy? Influence and effect in CUP were divided into two. Seemingly everything was made by the deputies and the Parliament. But in fact everything was happening due to the wills of the leaders of the Committee and the Party . It seems like an exaggeration to say that one hundred percent it was like that and so happened. But, generally, the truth was that. When the idealists in the leadership of CUP observed this mood of those who had been elected as deputies by the help of themselves, they tolerated the compulsory domination as a patriotic necessity not to give the government of the country into the hands of such kind of men. In fact, the decision-makers were 4-5 person who constituted the Central Committee of the CUP or 1-2 person(s) who were the members of the Central Committee and also deputies in the parliament." (Yalcin, 1954a: 4) .
Yalçın also wrote about how the decisions were taken: "Such an organization had reduced the value of the Chamber of Deputies † to nothingness. The laws and the decisions of the nation and the country were not taken in the Chamber of Deputies on the grounds of public disputes and negotiations. Behind closed doors, at a parliament meeting where it was not even known whether the majority of party was present or not, [the decisions] were determined by a majority result obtained in secret indoctrination. The sessions of Chamber of Deputies was in fact just only party meetings. The only task left to the Nation's Parliament was to record and approve the decisions which were taken outside of itself and to get information on them. " (Yalcin, 1954b: 4) Actually, this situation cannot be regarded as unique to the CUP and the Ottoman Empire. One of the criteria applied in political party typologies is the nature of the relationship between the parliamentary group and the non-parliamentary external party organization. While in cadre parties parliamentary group is superior and in mass parties an existence of the competition and balance situation between the parliamentary group and the external organization can be observed, in the parties in which the ideological level of integration is higher and so are defined as "believers' party", the external organization is superior to the parliament group (Özbudun, 1979: 82) . In this sense, of course the CUP was, in many respects (ideological position, member structure, organizational form etc.) far from the fascist or communist parties which are regarded as "believers' parties". Nevertheless the CUP ,even if not as much as those believers' parties, aimed a socio-economic transformation and since being very aware of that a political change could only last forever with social transformation, would not be satisfied with just only political change.
On the other hand, the issue is more clearer for the consistency of the ideological approaches of the fascist or communist parties. In terms of ideological stances of such parties, "parliamentary democracy" and its constituents, such as elections, parliament etc. are considered to be the tools that can be used for conjuncture on the way to the ultimate goal. The main problem, as we have already mentioned, occurs for the parties or organizations that emphasize the liberal democratic values such as parliament, constitution, elections. The tension between these liberal principles and the targeted social-political transformation can cause to postpone the liberal values for the sake of the latter. It has been emphasized that anti-regime social movements cannot turn smoothly into democratic parties in the absence of indigenous models for long-term democratic institutions, after a rapid regime change (Glenn, 2003: 147) . In the same way in countries where democratic ideas and attitudes are not rooted, serious problems have arisen in the post-monarchy era. It would not be wrong to say that one of the main sources of these troubles is the structure of the social movement or organization which overthrown the monarchy. Depending on the historical facts, it is a reality that these "revolutionary" structures are not eager to adhere to liberal democratic principles after the revolution even if they advocated them before the revolution. Therefore, it can be stated that oppressing periods usually come after the revolutions whatever the revolutionary ideology is.
The Union and Progress on one hand aimed a restricted political power via institutions such as parliament, constitution etc., on the other hand at the time when realized the obstacles of such a power structure for transformation of the social structure, it preferred to postpone such liberal values. Of course, it should be noted that the main purpose of the CUP was to rescue the state from collapse via transformation. The liberal institutions such as elections, parliament etc. were the important arguments of Unionists' opposition against the Abdülhamit's absolutism and undoubtedly the determinants of the political structure that the Unionists longed for. Nevertheless, the Unionists could easily abandon these principles for the sake of their main purpose, to rescue the Empire from collapse. In addition, as explained above, from the outset there was no doubt among the Unionist leaders about the supremacy of the external organization. One of the reasons for this was organizational and "national integrity" concern. As Duverger points out, the dominance of parliamentary members over the party gives a much decentralized structure to the party (Duverger, 1993: 250) . Members of the Parliament who were dependent on the electoral circles that send them to the parliament tend to think locally rather than nationally. Considering the Duverger's statement together with the structure of the Empire and the CUP, it can be said that if the parliamentary group was superior in the CUP, it would have been possible neither to protect the state nor to maintain the CUP's own existence.
A dispute about who would guide the destiny of the CUP and so the Empire was outburst for about three years after the reopening of the Constitutional Period. This dispute had shaken the dominance of the Central Committee. The fact behind this power loss was the struggle on, similar to other parties, whether the non-parliamentary organization or the parliamentary group would control the whole organization. Of course, it should be noted that this struggle had deeper sociological components.
OPPOSITION IN THE CUP: HIZB-I CEDIT ( THE NEW SECT)
The year 1911 marked the start of the last period for the Ottoman Empire in the context of the beginning of the Battle of Tripoli (Turco-Italian War) which was the first of a series of battles leading to the ultimate end. The Battle of Tripoli, which began in late September 1911, was followed by the Balkan Wars and then by the World War I; the Ottoman State which would be occupied at the end of this process would soon take its place in the depths of history. This process was the same for the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, which governed the destiny of the Empire in the last decade. In 1911, the CUP had faced a deep fragmentation in itself. Actually, the problem was going back until 1910. In September 1910, the Unionists seized a correspondence sent by Miralay Sadik Bey, also a Unionist, to officers in Manastır (Bitola), asking them to take part in a military coup (Kansu, 2016: 203) . When it came to 1911, the dimensions of the internal opposition began to change, and for the first time the Central Committee of the CUP met with a serious opposition from its own organizational structure. This opposition had risen over the duality between the Central Committee and the "Party", and dissident voices among the Unionist deputies had begun to arise against the Central Committee. The dispute about which part of the CUP would have the power in policy-making flared up and the parliamentary sect which was designed not as a determiner but as a means of policies , rebelled against the Central Committee.
In a sense, this can be seen as an attempt of the deputies, in other words the elected members of the CUP, to remind the non-elected members of the CUP, namely the Central Committee, to take themselves into account. The opposition coming from the "Party" sect of the CUP was naturally very effective enough to shake the authority of the Central Committee, and furthermore for the CUP it had almost turned into a survivability problem.
The resignation of Talat Bey from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in February 1911 in order to prevent further worn out of the CUP was interpreted by the opposition press as the success of Hizb-i Cedit (Hocaoğlu, 2010: 188) . Talat Bey, who resigned from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, became the chairman of the "Party" group (Akşin, 1987: 183) . This opposition movement was so influential that on April 19, 1911, Talat Bey issued a statement in which denied the rumours that the CUP was breaking up (Kansu, 2016: 217) . The situation was getting worse for the Central Committee. Therefore, the Central Committee had to seek ways of reconciliation in consultation with the dissidents. These negotiations took place on the 10-item request list of Hizb-i Cedid called as Mevadd-ı Aşere. These 10 articles were as follows (Tunaya, 1952: 186) :
 The deputies shall not pursue the privilege and other interests,  Deputies would not be civil servants at the same time,  For deputies to be elected as minister, a secret ballot method within party should be used and 2/3 majority should be necessary ,  Adherence to the laws and paying attention to the responsibilities of the deputies,  To try the unification of the elements (İttihad-ı Anasır * ) to be realized; work for the progress in trade, agriculture, industry and education,  while protecting the morality and the religious and national proprieties, it should be tried to develop the western progress and development also in the Ottoman country,  The continuation and the preservation of the historical Ottoman traditions under the framework of the Constitution (Kanun-Esasi),  By making a law it should be given an order to the appointment and dismissal of the civil servants,  Amendments of some articles of the Constitution regarding the holy law of the caliphate and reign should be made,  The activities of the committees with secret aims should be obstructed.
Some of these items could also be accepted and adopted by the CUP. However, the main aim lying behind these demands was to break the power of the Central Committee and to make the Parliamentary group the main power inside the CUP in determination of policies and implementation of decisions. The last item of those demands was already evidently targeting the main structure of the CUP which was outside the Parliament. Hence, the acceptance of these materials as they were, would not be possible at least at this stage. On the other hand, in the present conjuncture, a total rejection of the demands would cause disintegration of the CUP. Therefore, the Central Committee tried to postponed the matter for a while.
In a parliamentary group session of the CUP, it was declared that there were differences about general principles among the members. A text in which it was accepted that these differences would be discussed in depth at the Congress of the CUP scheduled for September, was signed by 170 deputies. So the issue was postponed till the Congress. According to Celal Bayar, this was a success of Talat Bey's intelligence, and meant that to make the members of Hizb-i Cedit accept the general congress as an arbiter for the settlement of the conflict (Bayar, 1997: 63) . By this way, the Central Committee had gained time till the Congress in September.
The Congress of the CUP was convened at the end of the September. This congress was the 4th and the last one convened in Thessaloniki (Levend, 1947: 2) . Therefore, the congress, although not yet known, was a farewell of the CUP to Thessaloniki which had a great importance in the establishment and development of the CUP ( Tekeli-İlkin, 1980: 351-382) .
Of course, the main issue in the agenda of the Congress was the presence of the internal opposition. However, on the day the Congress was convened, the attack of Italians to Tripoli inevitably changed atmosphere of the Congress.
THE CONGRESS
The Congress convened in Thessaloniki on September 30 th 1911 (Tunaya 1988 : 28) * . The congress was scheduled to convene on September 18; but it was postponed to September 30 th due to coincidence of the month of Ramadan (Tanin, Nu: 1086, 9 September 1911: 3). The congress ,which started on this date, continued until October 13 th . The beginning of the Congress coincided with the cabinet change. Grand Vizier Hakkı Pasha Cabinet resigned and Sait Pasha was appointed as Grand Vizier on the day the congress was convened. † This change meant a decline in the effectiveness of the CUP in government. The newly established Sait Pasha Cabinet, compared with Hakkı Pasha Cabinet, was further away from the CUP (Akşin, 1987: 189-190) .
61 delegates from different regions of the country participated in the Congress (Efendioğlu 2008: 105) . Fourteen of these delegates were the members of Chamber of Deputies. From Chamber of Notables Said Pasha, Cafer Pasha and Beserya Efendi were also present at the congress (Tanin, Nu: 1110, 5 October 1911: 2).
The topics to be addressed in the Congress were determined as follows (Tanin, Nu: 1121 , 19 October 1911 
):
 Reading and analysis of the annual report,  Necessary changes in the political program,  The amendment to be made in Internal Code,  Examination of the budget,  The demands of the opposition (Mevadd-ı aşere) and its details which were presented to the decision of the Congress.
During the first session of the Congress, Hacı Adil Bey was elected as president and Talat Bey was elected as vice-president of the Congress. In this first session of the Congress, the committees of press and Internal Code were also formed (Tanin, Nu: 1106, 1 October 1911: 4); it was also decided to form another committee to prepare the political program (Tanin, Nu: 1110 , 5 October 1911 . After the completion of the election, the report of the Central Committee was begun to read by Hacı Adil Bey (Cavid, 2014: 161) . In addition to reflecting the Central Committee's point of view on the events of the year 1911, the report also provided information on how Unionist leaders had been approaching the * The CUP organized 9 congresses between 1908 and 1918. The Congress in the years 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911were secret and convened in Thessaloniki. The congresses in the years 1912, 1913, 1914, 1916, 1917, 1918 (Akşin, 1987: 189) while Çavdar writes that the Hakkı Pasha Cabinet resigned on the day when the Congress convened (Çavdar,1994:121) . problems of the country, how they had been interpreting the notion of national sovereignty and how and in which ways they were producing solutions to the problems in general.
THE REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE *
In the Report the Central Committee had set out its views on the events that occurred during the past year and specified the ones that could be done and that could not be done during this period, indicating the expectations of the CUP on social, political, administrative and economic fields. Of course, the main part of the Report was an analysis of the dispute between the Central Committee and the group formed by the members of the CUP in the Parliament, briefly the "Party", which brought the CUP to the point of disintegration in the first half of 1911.
As it is known in the organization of the CUP, the parliamentary group was described as a "party". In the report the Central Committee stated that a proclamation had been issued after the dispute; and in that proclamation it had been stated that all sects of the CUP together was defined as a "Party". It seems that ,by this way, the Central Committee aimed to solve the issue from an organizational perspective. The CUP, by defining its total organizational structure as a political party, had gone on the path of expressing clearly that in the political affairs the authority was belonged to the CUP and therefore to the Central Committee.
It was stated in the report that the political organization of the CUP consisted of three layers. These three layers were:
 Heyet-i Müntahibe: All the Ottoman citizens who had the right to vote and were considering the unity of the Ottoman Empire and its progress;  Heyet-i İntihabiye: The election organization of the CUP;  Heyet-i Müntahabe: Party members in the Chamber of Deputies;
With this formulation, it was tried to be shown that the CUP, or more precisely the Central Committee had authority on the elected deputies. In the new Internal Code which would be prepared in the Congress the situation would be formulated exactly in the same way. In the report, expressing that the Heyet-i İntihabiye was an agent between the electorate and the elected ones, it was argued that the Central Committee, representing the executive board of the CUP, was also a means of coordination between the deputy members of the CUP in the parliament and the majority of the nation. The Central Committee argued in the Report that at some time the political side of the CUP was tried to be put aside and just only a social content was tried to be given. The Central Committee described that approach as "... a very strange situation". The Central Committee said that this approach meant to see the "Party as an authority both inside and outside the Parliament; whereas a power, not based on a political organization outside the parliament, could not sustain its power. The opponents' effort to push the Central Committee out of the politics was criticized and was trying to show that the main authority was the Central Committee in every field. Although the opponents in the CUP argued that the Parliamentary group should be decisive in political decisions, the Central Committee declared that the main decision-making authority was itself, that parliamentarians were only tools, that the Central Committee was the mean by which parliamentarians were elected and therefore the deputies had to obey to the decisions of the Central Committee. From that point of view those who owed being elected to the CUP and indeed to the Central Committee did not have the authority to act independently. The Central Committee considered that the constant contact of the Unionist majority in the Chamber of Deputies with the Central Committee would allow the members of the parliament to "benefit from general thoughts of the people and national will". From this statement it can easily be understood that the Central Committee, clearly, considered itself in place of "the people". In other words, it was argued that the "national will" was represented solely by the Central Committee. Therefore, the support of the Central Committee had a meaning as the support of "the people" and to be confronted with the Central Committee had a meaning of losing the consent of "the people". In the second case, the representative character of the deputies would also be questioned. According to Akşin (1987: 151) the 1911 Internal Code were intended to obscure the political mission and the dominant position of the Committee over the "Party" as much as possible. Actually, the Central Committee once more and clearly expressed the superiority of the Committee over the "Party".
The Central Committee was not satisfied with the explanations summarized above and needed to emphasize that 1908 Revolution was realized by itself. The Committee, which took the first step of the political revolution in 1908, left the task of fulfilling the reform measures by making laws to the deputies and the task of application of these laws to the Cabinet.
" While the Committee naturally had to maintain continuous protection and assistance to these powers which were emerged from the inside of itself, it was never be exempt from being always a political watchman and guard in order to conserve and defend the intention and mission which were stated in Article 1 of the Code." Therefore, the determination of the political direction was not within the authority of members in the Chamber of Deputies. It was argued that this authority exclusively belonged to the Central Committee, which claimed to represent the "national will" solely. The Central Committee, the owner of the Revolution, would determine the general political direction; deputies would be also obliged to obey to this general direction. The decisive power was not belong to the parliamentary group, but completely to the non-parliamentary organizational structure and its headquarters.
In the Report, it was stated that during the proclamation of the Second Constitutional era, the CUP was aimed to protect the unity of the homeland and to make the nation progress and therefore all the Unionists had been gathered on these two bases. But it was argued that the experience gained during the legislative activities merely revealed the fact that these two principles were not enough to represent the soul of a party. It was expressed that many other political and social principles had to be determined and that the members of a party had to be in a consensus on these principles. Since all the political and social principles of the CUP were not clearly defined and embodied in a scientific and philosophical system, the ministers themselves, or the members of the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of the Notables or the members of the Committee, assumed themselves to be authorized on unclear points. According to the Central Committee, this situation brought the incompatibility among the members of the Committee, the cabinet, and the deputies in the parliament. The Central Committee, underlining the fact that more members of Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Notables had joined in the existing congress unlike the previous ones, was hoping that these problems would be resolved at the congress. It should not be mistaken to say that this hope meant the establishment the Central Committee's absolute authority when the progress and result of the Congress were considered.
The Central Committee expressed that the tasks which were determined in the 1910 Congress such as to regulate the legislative activities of the Parliament, to make some regulations in order to strengthen the natural relationship and ties between the "Party" and the Committee and to prepare a new Internal Code could not be performed as expected and as a consequence of that failure a fair and powerful government could not be formed. The Central Committee also thought that the relations between the "Party" and the Central Committee was very superficial, perhaps because they were unfamiliar with the rules of the Internal Code. The Central Committee argued that the problems that occurred in the previous year were not caused solely by the lack of harmony between the executive and the legislative bodies, and stated that the main issue was the conflict among the members of the CUP in the Chamber of Deputies. At this point, the Central Committee began to put forward its opinion about the internal opposition that emerged in April. The Central Committee thought that the demands put forward by the opposition was not important enough to divide a party into two sects. In a sense, the Central Committee considered the CUP's internal dispute as a source of all the disputes experienced and thought that to put an end to these disputes was crucial not only for the sake of the Committee but also for the relation between legislative and executive bodies and hence the governance of the state. Therefore, the Central Committee accepted to form an intellectual and sensual unity in the CUP as the only way in order to eliminate the concerns and hesitations which were observed in executive power. This ,in particular, meant to suppress the internal opposition.
Considering the "Party"-the Committee segregation as the main source of problems experienced during the year, seemed to have led to the development of a discourse to abolish this dualism. Central Committee, in order to show that there could not be a separate "party" presence despite itself, stressed that the "Party" was in fact the Committee. The result of this consideration was the acceptance of superiority of the Central Committee over the whole organization including both the parliamentary group and the non-parliamentary one. Because of this approach, it is not wrong to say that in the 1911 Congress an important step was taken towards abolishment of the "Party"-Committee dualism. (Tunaya, 1989: 203) . The full abolution of this dualism would only take place in the 1913 Congress, where the CUP would declare itself as a political party (Tunaya, 1989: 203) .
To solve problem of disharmony between the executive and the legislature bodies, the Central Committee brought an amendment which they wanted to be made in the Constitution, to the agenda. The Central Committee was argued that in order to form a powerful government the authority of the dissolution of the parliament should belong directly to the Sultan and the requirement for the approval of the Chamber of Notables should be removed from the Constitution. We will discuss this issue in details while examining the Political Program of the CUP.
The Central Committee which explained that the political power and authority belonged to the CUP, underlined that the execution of the social revolution which was thought as a complementary to the political revolution, was also a responsibility of the CUP. The Central Committee emphasized that the CUP which determined the political principles as a "party", had to realize a social revolution as a promoter. It was declared by the Central Committee that the CUP had transformed the governmental system and laws via political revolution. The Central Committee advocated that unless the social revolution would be realized, there would be no great benefit from the transformation of the governmental system and laws and added that for this purpose the Central Committee had always suggested to the clubs of the CUP to work in order to establish social liberty, solidarity and justice. It was accepted by the Central Committee that the social organization of the CUP was much more successful than the political one. In this context, the works of the clubs of the CUP were briefly mentioned in the Report.
The Central Committee also explained their point of view while replying to the criticism directed towards them by the opposition and their views on the demands of the opposition. While doing so, first of all it was explained what the Central Committee understood from the concepts of conservatism and progressiveness. It was stated that the CUP wished to protect the holiness and traditions of Islam, the law of the holy Caliphate and the sultan, the princes, princesses and Sheikh al-Islam as well as the Ottomanism, the integrity of the country, national unity, Islamic religion and Turkish language. It was also added that the CUP had revealed the principles of reform, provided that these historical principles were preserved, The Central Committee, while explaining that the CUP was conservative in this regard, at the same time suggested that it was progressive. By such an argument a kind of "progressive conservatism" was put forward. The Central Committee also attempted to explain at what points it was progressive.
It was argued that the old regime was not in contact with the individuals. It left the people as tribes and congregations and only had contact with the heads of these groups. It was criticized that the individuals had been living under the semi-autonomous administration of the tribes, communities and fiefdoms. It was stated that the current governments could not make direct contact with the people because of the mistakes of the past and if conservatism was insisted on, this situation would continue. It is possible to find a criticism of the feudal social and political structure in these considerations.
Trying to establish an individual-based social and political order rather than a feudal one that governed the people through intermediary institutions, was a clear indication that the Unionists had been influenced by the Western liberal thinking.
Of course, trying to combine contradictory wills such as the desire to protect the Sultanate and the Caliphate together with a longing for a social-political structure that centers on the individuality had formed an important dilemma of the ideological structures of the Unionists which was also related to the conjuncture of the period.
The Ottomanism, according to the Central Committee, was of two kinds. While Ottoman political structure consisted of individuals with equal political rights, the Ottoman social structure was dominated by congregations which had a number of social institutions. The ones who had the political rights were the individuals. Communities that had no political rights was trying to gain political influence by expanding their social influence, and therefore they constantly conflicted with the government. The incidents of Albania, Yemen, Kerek, Iraq, Kurdistan, Macedonia were always due to the collision of the social forces of the tribes and congregations with the government forces, according to the Central Committee. The fact was that the Central Committee regarded the events that occurred in all these regions as feudal rather than ethnic ones. According to the Central Committee, the rebels occurred in Northern Albania, Yemen, Cebel-i Deruz, Kerek, Müntefik and Kurdistan had nothing to do with the idea of ethnicity; the main cause of these rebels was that the tribes were unable to adopt themselves with the central judicial organization. Of course, the CUP knew the fragile nature of Ottoman rule, especially in the borders. For this reason, according to the Unionists, especially Northern Albania, Yemen and Iraq had to be liberated from the traditional tribal and clan structures and had to be brought to the civilization. The project of modernizing these regions would be done by bureaucrats appointed from the center. By this way, the areas into which the government power penetrated would expand and the integration of these regions ,into the system would be ensured. (Emrence, 2012: 72-104) . But the CUP was also aware that there was not enough financial or cultural means to pass on this project. It was understood by the Central Committee that if the level of centralism would increase, the problems in these regions would deepen. In this conjuncture, the Central Committee was still trying to find a solution in a moderate way. This solution envisaged that tribal cases would be handled in special courts through special regulations and laws and that the social rules of these tribes would be base for their administration. In other words, even the centralist Unionists found their solution in not to interfere with the tribes' internal affairs. Tribes and congregation had been the main source of problems during the six hundred years of history, according to the Central Committee, who advocated that such kind of communities should be free in their social structures, while they were blocked to have influence in politics. The Central Committee argued that while Morocco and Iran were consist of tribes, India of castes, Austria of tribes and the other European nations of social classes, the Ottoman society was consisted of congregations at the first level and tribes at the second level. Reiterating the need for special laws about tribes and congregations to follow an effective domestic politics, the Central Committee once again emphasized that the problems in regions such as Yemen and Iraq could only be resolved by this way.
The Central Committee stated that one of the principles which was determined in the previous year was the unity of the elements and the 1910 Congress had set a political line which had included the respect to the languages and ethnicities of the various elements, the strengthening of the historical ties among the elements, not seeing any element a foreigner to the social family of the Ottomanism, not to be fooled by temporary cheers and not to forget the unification aim. The Central Committee confessed that even though it operated in this perspective, not enough activity was been put forth in the most important points of this motion line. At this point the Central Committee needed to explain what it understood from the term "unification of elements". The Central Committee argued that after the Proclamation of the Second Constitutional Era, there occurred different conceptions about the Ottomanism. Some saw it as a federative state which was formed of the unification of some powers and the congregations which had political power, while others claimed that the Ottoman society was formed of solely individuals and the congregations and communities to which these individuals belonged had to be assimilated by the Ottoman mass to ensure the unity of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the Central Committee revealed that they did accept neither of these conceptions, because the first was incompatible with the political and the second with the social structure.
In this instance, being conservative according to the Central Committee would transform the social decentralization, which was actually in the country, into a political decentralization which would mean federalism. The Central Committee, bringing the political decentralization, a nightmare for the Unionists, to the agenda, once more made it clear that they were in favor of a centralized state structure.
After all these descriptions, the Central Committee would try to explain how the progression should be. It was stated that the CUP was revolutionary in politics and evolutionist in social aspect. According to the Committee, if the conservatism was interpreted as aiming the social progress to be realized through evolution, there was no difference between theirs and this conception. If the conservation was interpreted as a will of protection of the historical heritage, again there was no problem. But if conservatism was interpreted as to maintain the evil customs, the Central Committee rejected this kind of conservatism.
As the Central Committee needed to respond to the accusations directed to the CUP when the Hizb-i Cedit was occurred, it was emphasized the importance given to Islam by the CUP. While doing so, The Central Committee did not hesitate to underline the problematic concepts such as national sovereignty, protection of homeland, and the Caliphate. Emphasizing that in the national sovereignty concept emerged in the Second Constitutional Era, the right of sovereignty was defined as belonged to the majority, the Central Committee suggested that the right to govern would be belonged to the Muslims who constituted the majority of the Ottoman society. Although this approach seemed to have an emphasis on Muslims, in fact it implicitly included the emphasis on Turkishness. Therefore, it should not be erroneous to say that, neither the non-Muslim elements of the Empire and nor the Muslim ones except the Turks would not have right to participate in government.
The Central Committee also strongly condemned the accusations that the Hizb-i Cedit directed to the leaders of the CUP about being Freemason and Zionist. Considering the effects of such accusations on the Muslim population, it was strongly expressed that the CUP was not related to such structures, such as Freemasonary and the Zionism. Especially when the initiatives of the World Zionist organization to establish an independent Jewish state in the Palestinian Territory of the Empire were taken into account, it became more clearer that these accusations would be quite harmful for the Committee.
In some other parts of the Report the Central Committee also referred to internal opposition and summarized the developments about this issue since the beginning of April and suggested that the Center had fulfilled its own responsibilities. The Central Committee also informed that it was decided to get the opponents out of the Society.
Another issue discussed by the Central Committee was the influence of the clergy on politics. Talking on the declaration of the Cemiyet-i Ilmiye-i Islamiye (Islamic Science Society), the Central Committee admitted that the clergy had to be out of the party struggles and electoral challengers. By these words the Unionists warned the clergy not to interfere in the politics. This can be better understood if we consider the efficiency of the clergy with the increasing opposition in Muslim regions, especially in the Arabian geography, and with the chronic problems.
In the Report of the Central Committee, an extensive coverage was given to the tour of Sultan Mehmed Rashad to Macedonia. The reason why this tour constituted an important place in the Report was that the tour was organized by the CUP because of the worsening situation in Albania and Macedonia. Therefore, the Committee expected some political consequences of this tour for the future of the Empire.
Also the training activities of the CUP were broadly included in the Report. Detailed information was given about the school constructions which were ongoing by the efforts of the Central Committee. It was explained that 900 liras for the ongoing construction of a high school in Ohrid and 300 liras for each Union and Progress Schools in Edirne and Erzurum were provided. It was stated that it was decided to transform the Union and Progress Schools in Thessaloniki and İzmir to teachers college and to open the Nesl-i Cedit (New Generation) Schools for the training of new generations. In the Report, it was expressed that the clubs continued to teach at night. Particular attention was also paid to the issue of education of the new generations. With these activities, the Committee had continued to be an educator with its clubs and educational institutions. Within the framework of the educational activities, a rich library was opened with the contributions of the science council and a study abroad committee was also established in order to send students abroad.
In the Report, some information on the economic affairs of the Committee was also mentioned. It was stated that the Hüdavendigar Seyr-ü Sefain (Bursa Sea Transport) Company was founded by the efforts of the Bursa Central Board of the CUP. Besides, it was decided to establish economic committees in the center cities of the provinces. The society stated that the aim of these economic efforts was to make the Ottoman society be independent in economic terms.
Following the reading of the report, the congress went to work and the regulations came to the fore in order to solve the problems pointed out by the Central Committee.
CONGRESS ACTIVITIES
The most important agenda item of the Congress was the growing opposition and the Hizb-i Cedid movement. The congress of the CUP was preparing to handle primarily ten-point program of the Hizb-i
Cedid (Mevadd-ı Aşere). In fact, it had been tried to prevent the disintegration of the CUP by transferring the issue to the congress and so by gaining time. In the Congress, the points of disagreement would be softened to prevent the disintegration of the Committee. For the Hizb-i Cedit, the aim was to remove the " Thessaloniki Clique" from the head of the CUP (Koloğlu, 1991: 293) . In this strained atmosphere, the CUP was rescued from to be disintegrated perhaps by the Battle of Tripoli [Turco-Italian War] (Avagyan, 2005: 90) . Of course the war had become the main issue and the Congress first dealt with the Tripoli issue. At the outset of the war, it was decided that the defense of the homeland should be foregrounded. The society had been forced to defend itself for several months because of the rising opposition, and had been struggling to protect its influence which had been rapidly declined because of the opposition. The war in such a conjuncture gave the Unionists a chance to take the initiative again by calling out the patriotic feelings of the people. In his memoirs published in the Tanin Newspaper, Cavid Bey notes that the pro-Hizb-i Cedid deputies who came to Thessalonica changed their minds (Tanin, 16 th September 1943: 2). In the Congress, it was decided to issue a declaration in order to call the Ottoman public against the Italian attack. The declaration was written by Cavid Bey and Hakkı Bey with Beserya Efendi, a member of the Chamber of Notables. Another declaration was also been issued in French for foreign countries. In declaration for internal public, while criticizing the attack of Italy, all of the Ottomans were invited to behave together and to trust politically to the government. In the French written declaration, it was demanded that major states should not be disinterested in Italy's violation of international law, while mentioning the external challengers that the Ottomans had faced in their efforts to establish the constitutional government in the country. Meetings and demonstrations organized for Tripoli created a recovery opportunity for the CUP. In a situation where the national sentiment had increased because of the war, the Central Committee succeeded in reaching a superior position to completely liquidate the internal opposition.
In such conditions, the Mevadd-ı Aşere came to the agenda of the Congress and the demands of the deputies related to the issue were heard. Some articles from Mevadd-ı Aşere were accepted by the other members of the CUP and the following resolutions were taken ( İttihad ve Terakki Kongresinin
Meclis-i Mebusan Ekseriyet Fırkasınca Kongreye Gönderilen Mevadd-ı Aşare Hakkında Sureti , 1327:1-9):
 The deputies should not pursue the privilege and other interests (Article 1). This article was accepted by other members of the CUP at the Congress. In order not to exploit the influence possessed by the members of the Chamber of Deputies and Chamber of Notables, it was accepted as necessary to make a legislative act by adding an article on the Constitution.  The deputies should not accept any civil service that would prevent them from fulfilling their duties properly(Article 2). In this regard, it was decided to add an article about not to appoint a deputy to a public office as a civil servant within six month after his resignation from the parliament.  The election of the ministers by secret ballot (Article 3). This article was not accepted on the grounds that it was contrary to the Constitution.  Full compliance with the Law (Article 4). It had already been mentioned that this was the very first duty of all the deputies. It was decided, if this article meant the government, to recommend to the government adopt a law in order to determine the responsibilities of the government.  It was stated that there was no need to make any arrangement about Article 5* and 6 † because they had already been included in the political program of the CUP.  It was stated that it was not necessary to make any regulations about the 7th article for the matters specified in the mentioned article had already been present in the Constitution.  It was decided to adopt at once a law that would regulate the promotion, dismissal and replacement of the civil servants. (article 8).  It was decided that there was no need to carry out any regulation concerning Article 9 and Article 10. Article 9 was about the strengthening of the holy law of the caliphate and the reign. It was argued that when the amendment of the Constitution related to Article 9 occurred, the political program of the CUP was also regulated in this way. Article 10 was about not to be a member of secret organizations. It was stated about that demand that in the law of associations the establishment of such organizations had already been banned and so there was nothing to do. It was emphasized that the duty of implementing this law was the duty of the government. It was also underlined that the members of the CUP could not be members of secret organizations as regulated in the CUP's political and social programs.
It seemed that the Congress of the CUP accepted a significant part of the demands of the Hizb-i Cedit. However, the Hizb-i Cedit's main intention was to ensure that the main decision-making body in the CUP would be the parliamentary group, not the Central Committee. Nevertheless, the Central Committee strengthened its power in the Congress and restored its dominance over the whole organizational structure of the CUP. And along with these decisions, it was also decided that the CUP should not recognize any organization in the name of Hizb [sect] (Cavid, 2014: 162) . By this way, the discussion on the Hizb-i Cedid came to an end. The case of Sadik Bey was investigated by a special council and it was decided to expel Sadik Bey from the CUP (Cavid, 2014 : 162, Tanin 16 October 1943 . Therefore, the opposition within the party was suppressed in the Congress. But the problem was not solved, it even got deeper. This dissident group, shortly after the Congress, would take part in establishing a political party which consisted of all the opponents of the CUP.
At the second meeting of the Congress, some changes in the Internal Code were discussed and some regulations were accepted (Tanin, 16, October 1943: 2) . The number of members of the Central Committee was decided to increase from 7 to 12 and also decided to be elected for a year (Tanin, Nu: 1109 , 4 October 1911 : 3, Tanin, Nu: 1112 , 7 October 1911 . As a result of the election Hacı Adil, Sabri, Nazim, Mithat, Eyüp Sabri and Naci went on being the members of the Central Committee while Talat, Ahmet Nesimi, Hüseyinzade Ali, Ali Fethi and Halil were elected as new members (Tanin, Nu: 1116 , October 11, 1911 . It was decided that Haci Adil Bey would continue as the secretary general. Also it was also determined that the members of the Central Committee should accept civil service only under the extraordinary conditions of the country (Tanin, Nu: 1112, 7 October 1911: 1).
Besides, although in the previous congresses three delegates were sent from the "Party" to the Congress, the number of the delegates coming from the "Party" was increased to a number equal to the one-tenth of the "Party" members (Tanin, Nu: 1117 , 12 October 1911 . This decision was aimed at making the Committee closer to the "Party". In order to coordinate the relations between the Committee and the "Party" it was decided to gather a congress which would be attended by all members in every four years (Tanin, Nu: 1121 , 19 October 1911 . Necessary arrangements in the Code was made for realizing such a congress.
The fifth article of the Code was amended and it was decided that the centers of the livas * would be an election circle and a central board would be established in each liva (Tanin, Nu: 1111 , 6 October 1911 . After examination of the Budget Council, the budget of the CUP was also approved (Tanin, Nu: 1121 , 19 October 1911 : 4, Tanin, Nu: 1117 , 12 October 1911 .
In the Congress, 1327 (1911) Political Program prepared by Cavid, Cahid and Hakkı were examined and given the final format (Cavid, 2014: 158) . The administrative, economic and educational parts of the program were rearranged and modified (Tanin, Nu: 1121 , 19 October 1911 .
The decisions demonstrated that the Congress belonged not to the "Party", but to the Committee (Tunaya, 1984:29-30 ). The most important thing for the Committee was the continuation of the Unionism. Leaving from the CUP, the deputies set up a number of opposition parties until 1911. For that, the "Party" could not be completely trusted. As consequences of these considerations it seemed that the Committee tried to fully dominate the "Party". In this context the congresses that took place until 1913 were political acts of the Committee (Tunaya, 1988: 201) .
1911 POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS
The issues set out in the report of the Central Committee were also reflected in the political program adopted by the Central Committee and submitted to the approval of the Congress. According to Emrullah Efendi, the political program of the Committee was established in order to preserve the political, legal and administrative unity of the Ottoman Empire (Emrullah, 1330: 7) .
The 1911 Political Program reflected the views of the CUP under four main sections such as Politics, Administration, Education, Economics and Development. (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin 1327 Senesi Siyasi Programı 1327:1-13) * . When we consider the program in general, it can be seen the hesitant mode rooted from trying to construct a nation-state without giving up the imperial mentality as it was in the Report of the Central Committee. Among these, the views on governmental system of the country were ,of course, the most important and attention-grabbing ones. In this context, the CUP planned to change some of the regulations that had come to light with the Constitutional Amendments of 1909 which was promoted by the Unionists. This attitude revealed the pragmatic side of the Unionists and that the Unionists could even give up some of their principles when circumstances required it.
Article 1 in the Political Section of the Program stated that "Every Ottoman who is twenty-five years old shall be proposed to have the right to be a first-stage elector " (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin 1327 Senesi Siyasi Programı 1327:2). Mete Tunçay stated that the age which was compulsory to be an elector was already set as 25 in the Election Law of August 2, 1908 and added that it was demanded that the electoral age would be reduced to 20 for everyone whether have or not have property and wealth in the 1908 and 1909 Political Programs of the CUP. However, he argued that before these programs of the CUP, the condition of having property was abandoned by Election Law. Giving these informations Tunçay came to a conclusion that this provision in the program might only be meaningful if it was interpreted in relation to women's political rights (Tunçay: 1992: 569). In our opinion this interpretation was not accurate. Because some other articles of the 1911 Program also included provisions already in the legislation but had desired to be changed in earlier programs. Therefore, by taking the provisions that had already been in the legislation, the CUP wanted to demonstrate that some of the past approaches had been changed. In this context, the emphasis in this article of the program was about the voters' age.
In 1908 and 1909, the CUP, which supported 20 years old to be a voter, was now defending 25 years. We can trace the cause of this change from Emrullah Efendi's explication. Emrullah Efendi stated that if the voting age would be reduced to 20, about 300 thousand people in the army would not be able to benefit from this unlike their peers (Emrullah, 1330: 37) . In the discussions held in the Congress, the fact that the level of education in the country had not yet reached the desired level was put forward as a justification for accepting the 25-year-old condition. (Tanin, Nu: 1119, 14 October 1911: 3-4). There was no explanation about women's suffrage in the section of Emrullah Efendi's explication about this issue.
On the other hand, Emrullah Efendi also stated that the CUP adopted a two-stage election procedure, until education level would increase and transportation routes and election regulations would develop. However, the 1909 Political Program was asked to replace the two-stage electoral system with a single-stage one. At this point, it was not wrong to say that a regression in the program of the Unionist could be observed. Interestingly, the same situation would be the case for the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP) nearly twenty years later. While the RPP's 1931 program aimed to adopt a singlestage electoral system, the 1935 program would advocate again the two-stage one. Single-degree of electoral system could take place in 1946.
One of the main issues in the program was the arrangement of the constituencies. The provisions of Article 72 of the 1876 Constitution dictated that the electors were bound to choose their deputies from among the inhabitants of the province to which they belong (Tunçay, 1992: 569) . This regulation had been opposed by the Unionists for a long time. Article 20 of the Political Program of 1908 had the following statement: "Every Ottoman possessing the required qualifications would be offered to have the right to be elected on every part of the Ottoman country" (Tanin, Nu: 56, 25 September 1908: 1) . This request was re-expressed in the 1911 program.
In order to analyze the Unionist thought, it was important to understand the reasons why the Unionists aimed to amend the constitutional provision of Article 72. By amending this provision, the Unionists aimed to adopt a "national representation" concept instead of an imperial representation understanding, to constitute a "national mentality" and to increase the emphasis on the national integrity against the regionalism and localism. member of the Chamber of deputies represents the whole body of Ottomans, and not exclusively the circumscription which has elected him." In a sense, there might also be a partial discrepancy between Article 71 and Article 72 of the Constitution. The proposal of the Unionists was also regarded as an effort to eliminate this incongruity. In his rather long commentary on the 1911 Political Program Emrullah Efendi discussed the issue in details. Acting on the theories and approaches of sovereignty in order to explain the reason for the mentioned demand in the Political Program, Emrullah Efendi explained that the sovereignty belonged to the whole nation and the elected deputies had to represent the whole of the nation, not a segment of the people. He argued that the provision in the Article 72 of the Constitution meant to say the people that they could not elect the deputies out of whom they want and according to him such an approach constituted a contradiction to the national sovereignty and the representation of the nation. Therefore, he rejected the imperative mandate. (Emrullah 1330: 23) . In this point, it is useful to briefly explain the meanings of the imperative mandate and free representational mandate. In the conception of the imperative mandate, the representatives represent not the whole nation but only the ones who elected them and are always under the control of the electorate. In the case of national sovereignty, the representatives represent the whole nation and the nation can only be represented by the whole legislative body, and in this case they do not act according to the imperative mandate (Teziç, 1986: 95) . Therefore, the results of the imperative mandate and free representational mandate may be quite different from each other As explained above, Article 71 of the Ottoman Constitution adopted the principle of free representational mandate. Erdogan Tezic noted that although the Empire did not have a national character due to the fact that the Empire was composed of different nationalities at the time, and it was not constituted on the principle of national sovereignty, the presence of such a provision in the Constitution could be explained by the idea of Ottomanism which was thought to be a unifying principle (Teziç,1986: 97) . On the other hand, Article 72 which stated that the deputies could only be elected from the inhabitants of the region reflected an imperialistic mentality. In other words, the Constitution, while taking the Ottoman unity into consideration, brought forth the principles of representational mandate and, on the other hand, allowed a regional / local representation with an imperial mentality. This dual nature of the Constitution had been disturbing the Unionists.
Emrullah Efendi also pointed out another reason why the Unionists were so disturbed by Article 72 of the Constitution. According to him, another disadvantage of this Article was that it would lead to the federation. The election of the deputies only from the people of that region meant to represent not the interests of the nation, but the province.
"Then the Chamber of Deputies is not be a genuine national symbol, but just a legislature which demonstrates the sum of the powers divided among provinces. Then we give a start of federalism in our country by our hands." (Emrullah, 1330:20) As it was understood from the explanation of Emrullah Efendi, the amendment of the relevant article of the Constitution was also important in terms of "national integrity" from the Unionist viewpoint. This demand, which was included in the programs of 1908 and 1911, was realized in 1916 with an amendment made in the Constitution (Tunçay, 1992: 569) .
The 5th and 7th articles in the program of the CUP which emphasized the concepts such as the national sovereignty and the national will are quite interesting. At the Congress, it was decided to put the request of an amendment in the 7th and 35th articles of the Constitution into the political program. In accordance with this decision, Article 5 of the political program stated that the parliament would convene by itself every year in November and that their working time would be four months. It was argued that the authorities on earlier gathering of the parliament, the extension of the working time of the Parliament, or sending the Parliament to holiday temporarily and reunion the Parliament had to belonged to the Sultan. According to Article 7, in the case of a dispute between the cabinet and the Parliament, it was requested that the authority of changing the Cabinet or the dissolution of the Parliament should belonged the Sultan and that approval requirement of the Chamber of Notables in dissolution of the Parliament should be lifted (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin 1327 Senesi Siyasi Programı 1327:3-4). "In the event of the Chamber of Deputies throwing out a Bill, and assigning its reasons therefor, upon the adoption of which Bill the Minister is of opinion he ought to insist, His Majesty the Sultan, in the exercise of his sovereignty, orders either a change of Ministers or a dissolution of the Chamber, subject to the re-election of Deputies within the period appointed by the law."
With the 1909 amendment, it was accepted that in such a case the Cabinet would resign and a new cabinet would be formed. If the new cabinet would insist on the decision and the parliament again would refuse, the Chamber of Deputies could be dismissed by the sultan. The 1909 amendment also changed Article 7 of the Constitution and it was accepted that the dissolution authority of the sultan could be used with the approval of the Chamber of Notables in accordance with Article 35. Now the CUP aimed to strengthen the executive body against the legislature by turning the situation back before the 1909 Amendments.
Another important change was seen in the appointment of the members of the Chamber of Notables. According to the 60th article of the Constitution, members of Chamber of Notables shall be nominated by the Sultan and the number of senators could not exceed a third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies. Article 62 stipulated that senators would be nominated for lifetime. The CUP was in favor of changing these provisions adopted in the establishment of Chamber of Notables. With the second article of the 1908 Political Program of the CUP it had been brought to the agenda that the one third of senators would be nominated by the Sultan while the other two thirds would be elected by the people and the they would be senators for a limited time (Tanin, Nu: 56, 25 September 1908: 1) . In Article 2 of the Political Program of the Ottoman Party of Union and Progress, dated 1909, there was a provision that one third of the Senators should be nominated by the sultan and two thirds should be elected on the basis of "the sovereignty of the nation". In the same article, it was stated that the period of being a senator should be limited to nine years (Tunaya,1952: 211 . In 1908 and 1909, the Unionists who expressed that at least two thirds of the senators should be elected by the votes of the people or according to the " principle of national sovereignty " now accepted the nomination of the Sultan. They seemed to prefer a Chamber of Notables appointed by a ruler which was under their control to the one of which majority were elected by the people. In this respect, it can be seen as a regression of the Unionists from "the principle of the national sovereignty".
It was stated in the last and the 12th article of the Political Section of the Program that it would be tried to abolish the capitulations ((İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin 1327 Senesi Siyasi Programı 1327:6).). Thus, for the first time, the CUP had included the abolition of the capitulations in its program. Taking the abolition of the capitulations into the political section the CUP also implied that the capitulations issue included a meaning beyond the economic dimensions. In fact, the abolition of the capitulations had taken place in Ibrahim Pasha's government program, which was read on January 25, 1911. At the beginning of the Battle of Tripoli, Italy's capitulation privileges were abolished. The CUP now clearly demanded the abolition of the capitulations, but also knew very well that this could only be put into practice if there would be nothing left to lose. Therefore, the capitulations were abolished only just after the beginning of World War I.
The administration part of the program reflected the familiar views of the Unionists on the provincial administration of the country. Once again and strongly, political or administrative autonomy were rejected definitely. It indicated that the provincial administration would be based on the principles of deconcentration and segregation of duties (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin 1327 Senesi Siyasi Programı 1327:6-9).
It was stated that the existing administrative body was composed of four grades, as, beginning from the smallest one, the townships, the districts, the livas and the provinces and accepted that a number of changes could be made while preserving the main structure. This was also interesting since the number of independent livas had increased rapidly since the beginning of the Second Constitutional Era. Increasing the number of independent livas in subsequent process constituted a significant issue on the way to the gradually abolition of an administrative unit. * However, in the political program, the CUP did not seem to have any intention at this point.
In the Education Section of the Program, on one hand the desire about the government's control over the schools of the non-Muslim communities were expressed, on the other hand the principle of not interfering with the language, belief and literature of any ethno-religious groups was adopted (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin 1327 Senesi Siyasi Programı 1327:9-10).According to the program, it would be obligatory to teach Turkish just only as a language in primary schools. The language of instruction in each school would be the language which was spoken in the region where the school was located. After the beginning of the Second Constitutional Era, the Unionists had wanted to take control of the nonMuslim schools. It was important for them to make the Turkish to be a unifying language of all the Ottoman elements. In this context, the 1908 and 1909 political programs included the clause "The Turkish is mandatory in the primary education". But this policy of the Committee of Union and Progress was softened because of the growing political and social opposition. In 1911, the CUP reconciled with the patriarch on education and language issues. It should also be noted that Emrullah Effendi who adopted all of these regulations when he was the Minister of Education resigned from the post, at the beginning of 1911. (Özbozdağli 2016: 162-163) .
At the beginning of the Economics and Development section of the Program, some regulations about the tithe could be seen. It was stated that although to convert the tithe into a land tax by the development of the cadastral method was aimed, it was not yet time for the realization of this. Therefore, it was expressed that the problems of the implementation of the tithe should be solved and the tax rate should be reduced. It was quite natural that the CUP who had tended to construct an economic order which would be appropriate to the capitalism, aimed to abolish the tithe which could be considered as a feudal tax type. However, the abolition of the tithe was abolished in the republican period (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin 1327 Senesi Siyasi Programı 1327:13-15). There were other regulatory desires towards the peasants' life in the Program. The arguments such as , mentioning a land reform, regulation of the tax rate in fair manner, taking measures in order to settle the tribes, adaptation of a new law to set relations between the landowners and the peasants could be accepted for the desire of the Unionists to transform a feudal territorial order into a modern one.
In the assessment of the Program, while Tunaya wrote that there was taken as a step towards the diagnosis of underdevelopment (Tunaya, 1989: 231) ; Çavdar found an anti-feudal approach (Çavdar, 1994: 90) .
CONCLUSION
The Unionists who opposed the Abdulhamid's absolutism by promoting the terms such as constitutionalism, parliamentarianism, etc. and found opportunity to realize these ideals in 1908, began to put such principles aside or "postponed" for at least a while later in the Second Constitutional period. This postponement were based on the idea that it would take a long time or even not to be possible to realize the desired urgent transformation via these institutions because of the socioeconomic structure of the country. It is also necessary to add that in terms of the Unionist ideas, the institutions such as the parliament and the Constitution, were the means of rescuing the Empire, gradually weakened by the presence of nationalist-separatist movements on its territory, rather than to establish a political-economic order which would guarantee the individual political liberty via strengthening the individual against the state by limiting the political power. The institutions such as the parliament, the elections and the constitution were regarded that they would provide the integrity of the Ottoman country by contributing to construct an Ottoman "nation". One of the most important aspects of that period was to adopt the socio-cultural and socio-economic structure into the "modern" world order, namely to the capitalist system. Of course, this transformation was not something that could be easily accomplished. The first of the most important reasons behind the difficulty of such kind of transformation, was that the Ottoman Empire, which had been situated on a huge territory, included different social structures in every respect (ethnic, religious, sectarian, linguistic, cultural, economic etc.) . In such a structure, when the Unionists thought that elections, parliament and other institutions would not be helpful to realize the social-economic-cultural transformation, they did not hesitate to 
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put these principles aside. In this respect, the 1911 Congress was important to understand the Unionist viewpoint. The arguments developed against the opposition, way of handling the opposition case, the regression of the new program in terms of liberal principles, provided important clues in understanding the Unionists' mentality. On one hand talking about national sovereignty, on the other hand asking for the re-granting the authority of dissolution of the parliament to the Sultan, defending the nomination of the members of Chamber of Notables for lifetime by the Sultan and was in favor of the two-grade election for at least a while although they were advocating single-grade election in 1908 indicates that the Unionists did not insist on liberal values such as elections and the parliament in cases where they saw them as obstacles. Of course, as mentioned above, demanding to re-grant some authorities to the Sultan or to preserve the authority of the Sultan did not mean that the Unionists wanted to return back to the old regime. When it is taken into consideration that the sultan in the period was the Mehmet Reşat who was not eager to interfere in politics, the Unionists wanted regranting these authorities to a sultan who was under their control. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that the Unionists would, in fact, want to take these authorities to their own initiatives. Therefore Tunaya's description about the CUP is quite proper:
"The only concept and purpose of the Union and Progress was to have power. No power of dress had been abundant for the Union and Progress which could easily forget freedoms, elections, assemblies, oppositions and everything related to them "(1989: 610).
The target was to rescue the state by having power and establishing a "new order". The concepts such as elections, parliament and etc. would only be a servant of these goals, and when they would become unable to serve them, it would be necessary to be dismissed or interpreted differently from the real meanings.
On the other hand, another strained point of the Unionist policies was to try to construct a nation-state without giving up the Empire. The consequences of these contradictory aims demonstrated itself in such statements as on one hand indicating the freedom of the non-Muslim congregations in educational affairs , on the other hand speaking of governmental supervision. This confused approach was also reflected in their attitudes towards the tribes. On the one hand they wanted to put the tribes under control; on the other hand they were developing mediatory formulas since being aware of that they could not accomplish this mission in the lacking of the necessary means.
As a result, the Unionists who used the concepts such as constitution, elections, parliament and freedom against the Abdülhamit's rule, throw these principles away and even completely forgot them in order to realize the social, economic and political transforms they planned in the Second Constitutional Era. Therefore, they adopted more authoritarian methods as long as they realized that they would not be able to establish a nation-state , in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-sectarian geography, via the institutions such as parliament, elections etc. Their reaction and attitude towards the internal opposition in 1911 also reflected a sign of authoritarianism. In terms of such structures, the internal opposition is more important than the outer one. Therefore, the problem of internal opposition must be come to a solution immediately. Because being strong depends on internal unity in such kind of committees. Therefore, the internal opposition is no case to be welcomed. The attitude developed against the internal opposition will be put forward also against the external opponents. Because the rescue of the state depends on the achievement of the goals determined by the headquarters of the revolutionary committee which solely knows the national will and interest, any opposition to the headquarters can easily be seen as a traitorous movement and the opponents can easily be declared as an "enemy" or a "traitor".
Degrading the issue only to a question like "establishment of a liberal regime or recovery of the State" constitutes a so-called contradiction between these two concepts. The consequence of such kind of an approach will be intolerance to opposition. In this context, the answer given by the Unionists to the question above was the "recovery of the State" and therefore, both the CUP and the state became more authoritarian bodies. Nevertheless the state could not be rescued.
REFERENCES Periodicals
Tanin
